你到达一个校园活动入口。现场已经有人在排队，你需要决定自己站到哪里。

Before Step 1

你快到活动门口了

等画面开始后，请按第一反应选择你会站到的位置。场景会自动开始，也可以直接进入。

页面将在 10 秒后自动开始；你也可以直接点击开始。

Step 1

现场

你走到门口。请选一个你会站的位置。

校园活动签到处
入口
Step 2

你已经进入活动现场

老师正在收集同学们刚才进场时的选择感受。请按你刚才的印象回答。

已记录本次反馈

这份记录先保存在你的浏览器里。


        


        

          
        


        

          

            

              
研究问题

              
How do differences in visible queue length in an interactive online queue simulation affect high school students' line choice?

            

            

              
假设

              
When one line is visibly more crowded and everything else is the same, high school students may choose the crowded line more often.

              
Reason: other people's choices can look like a signal of reliability.

            

            

              
为什么重要

              
In real life, we often choose with incomplete information. A long line can mean more waiting, but it can also look safer or more correct.

              
Online platforms use similar signals too: likes, views, ratings, downloads, and popularity labels.

            

            

              
我做了什么

              
I built a one-minute queue-choice simulation. Users see three lines for the same entrance, choose one line, and explain why.

              
The page records the selected line, the crowded line, whether the crowded line was chosen, response time, and a short reason.

            

            

              
期待的初步发现

              
The user study has not run yet. I expect some users to choose the crowded line because it feels more reliable or more likely to be correct.

              
I also expect some users to choose shorter lines because they care more about speed.

            

            

              
下一步

              
I will add a more controlled version, such as a balanced condition where all lines have similar lengths.

              
Then I can compare choices with and without a strong crowd signal.

            

          


          

            
          

          

            
References used in this project

            
    
              
  • Banerjee (1992): people may rationally follow a group when others' actions seem informative.
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  • Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992): early choices can create informational cascades.
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  • Cai, Chen, and Fang (2009): showing popular restaurant choices can change what people order.
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  • Salganik, Dodds, and Watts (2006): online popularity signals can shape choices and make outcomes less predictable.
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  • Zhou and Soman (2003): waiting lines are also social scenes, not only time costs.
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